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In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 1 a majority of the Supreme
Court declared a Richmond, Virginia voluntary program for minority-owned
business enterprises (MBEs) unconstitutional. A plurality injected a lethal
dose of strict scrutiny into the heart of race-conscious set-aside programs. 2
First, the Court held that Richmond failed to demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest to remedy private economic discrimination. 3 In doing
so, the Court soundly rejected the city's contention that remedying "past
societal discrimination" was a compelling governmental interest.4 Second,
Croson held that Richmond failed to identify the effects of past discrimi-
nation with "specificity" and that the factual predicate was not strong
enough to establish a "prima facie case of a constitutional or statutory
violation."' Third, the Court held that the Richmond set-aside was not
"narrowly tailored" to prevent lawmakers from enacting legislation fur-
thering their own racial group.6 Thus, the Court held that Richmond lacked
the constitutional authority to devise the race-conscious set-aside program.
Croson departed from a line of jurisprudence developed in Fullilove v.
Klutznick.7 In Fullilove, the Court upheld afederal MBE because "Congress,
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1. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
2. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy applied
strict scrutiny. Id. at 493, 520. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens would have
applied intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 514, 554.
3. Id. at 505.
4. Id. at 470.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 495-96.
7. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). Fullilove involved the Public Works Employment Act of 1977, in
which Congress imposed a requirement that 10% of the federal grants for local public works
projects be allocated to minority-owned businesses. See 42 U.S.C. § 6705(0(2) (1988).
The set-aside held constitutional in Fullilove was nearly identical to the program held invalid
in Croson. Croson, 488 U.S. at 528 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The "only significant difference
between the two [programs] was that in Croson there was a 300%6 set-aside, while in Fullilove
the set-aside was only 10% .... [I]n Fullilove the relevant minority population represented
between 15% and 18% of the total population, while in Croson it represented 50%." Rosenfeld,
Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive Meaning of Constitutional Equality,
87 MICH. L. REv. 1729, 1745 n.71 (1989) (citations omitted).
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unlike any state or political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate
to enforce the dictates of the fourteenth amendment." 8 The Court later
held in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission9
that intermediate scrutiny, not strict scrutiny, was the appropriate equal
protection standard for "benign race-conscious measures mandated by Con-
gress."10
Although Metro's holding shields federal affirmative action programs
from strict scrutiny, Croson's holding spread like a deadly virus into the
heart of state and local MBEs not authorized by Congress, causing the
post-Croson demise of state and municipal set-aside programs." As a result,
some commentators predict that state and local set-aside programs are
indeed dead and that the Supreme Court will no longer consider affirmative
action cases such as Croson.12
This Note will argue that the era of state and local set-aside programs is
in fact over and that this perilous condition will persist due to the equal
protection standard of review mandated by Croson. First, it will present
and criticize the Court's rationale for applying strict scrutiny for state and
local race-conscious set-aside programs. Second, it will describe the dilemma
created by Croson's mandated factual predicate. Finally, it will present
guidelines for federal legislation which will make it easier for states and
localities to create set-aside programs.
I. RATIONALES AGAINST STRICT SCRUTINY
There are three types of MBE set-aside programs. The first type mandates
that an established percentage of the total number of state or municipal
8. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490. This mandate is predicated on section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment, which states: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legis-
lation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
9. 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990). Metro involved two minority ownership programs of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC). Congress enacted the legislation in
an attempt to satisfy [the FCC's] obligation under the Communications Act of
1934 to promote diversification of programming, taking the position that its past
efforts ... had not resulted in sufficient broadcast diversity, and that this
situation was detrimental not only to the minority audience but to all of the
viewing and listening public.
Id. at 3000.
10. Id. at 3008 (footnote omitted).
11. See, e.g., Associated Builders & Contractors of La. v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 919
F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1990); Tafoya v. City of Albuquerque, 751 F. Supp. 1527 (D.N.M. 1990);
Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors v. Cuomo, 743 F. Supp. 977 (N.D.N.Y. 1990);
Miami Tele-Communications v. City of Miami, 743 F. Supp. 1573 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
12. See Fein, Lee, Choper, Howard & Neuborne, The Brennan Legacy: A Roundtable
Discussion, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1991, at 53, 54 ("Croson essentially freezes affirmative action at
the local level."); Stigmatic Harm, 248 THE NATION 183 (1989) (strict scrutiny imposed by
Croson "probably dooms any other state or local contract set-aside"). But see Taylor, Equal
Protection Dilemma of Voluntary State and Local Set-Aside Programs for Minorities and
Women, 27 Hous. L. REV. 45, 51 (.1990) (Croson "does not represent the inevitable consti-
tutional demise of state and local MBE programs.").
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contracts awarded each year be set aside and assigned to minority-owned
businesses. 3 For example, in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., the
Richmond city council created a pure set-aside by requiring that thirty
percent of its contracts be awarded to MBEs.14 The second type of set-aside
program requires that all prime contractors spend a percentage of the
contract price with minority-owned subcontractors. 5 The third type of set-
aside requires that a prime contractor submit with their bid an "affirmative
action plan" which commits the contractor to hire a specific percentage of
minority-owned subcontractors. 6
Since set-aside programs require that a certain percentage of bids be
accepted strictly from minorities, nonminorities are denied access. Therefore,
effective set-aside programs must deny economic opportunities to one racial
group in order to provide economic opportunities to another racial group.
This dilemma has fostered cries of "reverse discrimination" from various
sectors of the business and political community. 17 Disgruntled plaintiffs in
Fullilove, Croson, and Metro echoed this sentiment.
13. See Wilson, Comment, Set-Asides of Local Government Contracts for Minority Owned
Businesses: Constitutional and State Law Issues, 17 N.M.L. REv. 337 (1987).
14. 488 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).
15. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 616
F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1061 (1980). In the plan discussed in Associated,
the board of education required prime contractors to spend 25% of the contract price with
minority-o~yned subcontractors. Id. at 1383.
16. See Appeal of Associated Sign & Post, 485 N.E.2d 917 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). The
Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the application of a regulation initiated by the Bloomington
City Human Rights Commission which required contractors submitting bids to submit an
additional affirmative action proposal. Id. at 918-19.
17. Initially, race-conscious programs received minimal public resistance:
Efforts to eliminate discrimination through affirmative action received wide-
spread and broad-based support when blatant forms of discrimination were more
prevalent. However, the enthusiasm for the economic redistribution that had
evolved during the 1960's civil rights era began to wane in 1971 when the
worldwide economic recession started to have an impact on the American econ-
omy. The continued expansion of the middle-class sector was no longer assured,
and white males who found themselves competing not only with other white
males but also with [African-Americans], other minorities, and women, began to
seek judicial redress for their own claims of discrimination. Thus, affirmative
action became one of the more controversial and vigorously litigated issues
because it was claimed to impose discrimination in reverse against white male
citizens and was, therefore, legally and morally indefensible.
Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action: An Analysis of Competing Theories of Equality
and Weber, 50 N.C.L. REv. 531, 536 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
Randall Kennedy asserts that the cries of "reverse discrimination" are unfounded because
whites cannot be harmed constitutionally by affirmative action programs such as set-asides:
[T]he claim [is] that the constitutional injury done to a white whose chances for
obtaining some scarce opportunity are diminished because of race-based allocation
schemes is legally indistinguishable from that suffered by a [African-American]
victim of racial exclusion .... [However,] the injury suffered by white "victims"
of affimative action does not derive from a scheme animated by racial prejudice.
Whites with certain credentials may be excluded from particular opportunities
1991]
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Race-conscious set-asides, although divisive, attempt to alleviate -a color-
conscious America. However,
color-consciousness is unavoidable while the effects of decades of gov-
ernmentally and privately imposed racial wrongs persist. The concept of
affirmative action has arisen from that inescapable conclusion. A society
that forecloses racially-conscious remedies would not be color-blind, but
morally blind. The justification for affirmative action to secure equal
access to the job market lies in the need to overcome the effects of past
discrimination .... While care must be taken to safeguard against
abuses, affirmative action . .. including those programs in which nu-
merically based race-conscious remedies have been employed, can meet
this fundamental standard.18
Race-conscious programs not only aid minorities but aid the nation as
well. MBEs also alleviate the adverse economic impact of racial discrimi-
nation. Ralph C. Thomas, the Executive Director of the National Associ-
ation of Minority Contractors, noted that set-aside legislation "is no different
than other laws which routinely grant some form of 'preference' to a pre-
determined class of eligibles in order to achieve economic results."' 9
For example, the Buy American Act often requires that American
business firms be given a bid preference of either 6 or 12 percent over
foreign firms when competing for federal contracts. On its face such a
law appears to be blatantly discriminatory ....
they would receive if they were [African-American]. But this diminished oppor-
tunity is simply an incidental consequence of addressing a compelling societal
need: undoing the subjugation of the [African-American]. Whites who would be
admitted to professional schools in the absence of affirmative action policies are
not excluded merely because of prejudice, as were countless numbers of [African-
Americans] .... Rather, whites are excluded "because of a rational calculation
about the socially most beneficial use of limited resources for [professional]
education."
Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99 HAgv.
L. REv. 1327, 1336 (1986) (footnote omitted); see also Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 1789-90
(footnotes omitted):
Compensatory affirmative action ... is not meant to deprive whites of equal
respect. The intent behind racial discrimination is exclusionary while that behind
compensatoyy affirmative action is inclusionary.... Furthermore, the effects of
failure in the competition for scarce public goods are not likely to be the same
for [African-Americans] and whites. Such a failure by a white is unlikely to lead
to his being treated as a second-class citizen. A similar failure by a[n] [African-
American], however, is likely to perpetuate the stigma of racial stereotypes and
to inhibit the achievement of genuine equal dignity and respect. ...
[T]he only thing that affirmative action seems to take away from the "innocent"
white person is the increased prospects of success gained as a consequence of the
racially discriminatory acts ... of the state. The reduction in the prospects of
[African-Americans] attributable to official racial discrimination has already
produced a windfall in the form of increased prospects of success for all the
other competitors seeking to obtain scarce public goods.
18. Belton, supra note 17, at 597-98.
19. Thomas, Minority Participation in Government Construction Projects: Developing New
Approaches, 8 CONSTRUCTION LAW. 15, 18 (1988).
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[However,] [i]n [sic] such a law were ... challenged as violating the
United States Constitution . . .the courts would use a "rationality test"
standard .... 20
John Jacob, president of the National Urban League, and Derrick Bell,
a Harvard law professor, believe that "whites need to understand that their
negative views of minorities and the resulting discrimination have a direct
economic impact in terms of potentially lost productivity as the work force
over time becomes populated by fewer whites and more minorities.
' 2
[T]he opportunity for full participation in government procurement by
minority businesses is essential not only to obtain social and economic
equality for such persons but also to improve the functioning of the
state, county or local economy.
By increasing the number of businesses which vie for its construction
contracts, a locality should eventually enjoy more competitive costs
.... Another by-product of increased minority business participation
is greater competitiveness among government contractors which results
in an improvement of the quality of the services performed.-
In sum, although race-conscious set-asides are divisive, they have enormous
societal and economic benefits.
Prior to Croson, the Supreme Court and federal courts of appeals had
permitted competent public bodies, such as state legislatures, 23 school boards,24
and local governments, 25 to enforce the fourteenth amendment. In addition,
state-sponsored set-asides were afforded a variety of constitutional treat-
ments by lower courts. 26 Therefore, before Croson Congress's "unique"
powers under the fourteenth amendment did not preclude other competent
bodies from remedying acts of past discrimination.
The Croson plurality applied strict scrutiny27 to the Richmond MBE
because of their belief that state and local set-asides deny majority-owned
20. Id. at 18 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
21. Whites' Racial Stereotypes Persist, Wash. Post, Jan. 9, 1991, at Al, col. 1, A4, col.
6; see also Kennedy, supra note 17, at 1329 ("[A]ffirmative action ... [has taught] whites
that [African-Americans], too, are capable of handling responsibility, dispensing knowledge,
and applying valued skills.").
22. Thomas, supra note 19, at 17-18.
23. See Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 172 (6th Cir. 1983).
24. See Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 662 F.2d 550, 559 (9th Cir. 1981),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 457 U.S. 594 (1982).
25. See Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 938 (1981).
26. A comprehensive overview of lower court decisions and the levels of scrutiny used can
be found in Kende, Note, Principles of Competence: The Ability of Public Institutions to
Adopt Remedial Affirmative Action Plans, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 581, 592-93 & n.56, 622 n.174
(1986).
27. Rosenfeld describes the Croson strict scrutiny test as "an abstract, detached, and purely
formal procedure rather than as a substantially fair and practically oriented means to resolve
conflicting claims to constitutional entitlement under the equal protection clause." Rosenfeld,
supra note 7, at 1732.
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businesses the individual rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment."
Additionally, the Court held that Congress was the only legislative body
that possessed a "unique" power to enforce the fourteenth amendment
upon the states.29 Therefore, the Court in Croson found strict scrutiny
applicable to state and local set-asides.30
Croson acknowledged that a state may have a compelling interest in
rectifying specific discrimination found in both public and private institu-
tions.3 However, the Court held that "societal discrimination" was not
specific enough to qualify as a compelling state interest 32 and that a
governmental body would have to show that a public entity, in using public
funds, would "not serve to finance the evil of private prejudice. '33
For two reasons, the outcome in Croson might have been different had
the set-aside been enacted by the Virginia legislature rather than by the
Richmond city council. First, in holding state and local governments to the
highest scrutiny, the Croson Court took little notice of section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment which applies directly to the states.3 4 The states,
Furthermore, the set-aside program the Croson Court held invalid was remedial and had
already expired six months before the Court issued its decision. Id. at 1748. "It is thus ironic
that this important affirmative action decision ... should settle a dispute over a defunct
plan." Id.
28. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 493; see also Taylor, supra note 12, at 54 (The Croson
plurality "adamant[ly] belie[ved] that the equal protection guarantees of the fourteenth amend-
ment create essentially personal rights ... as opposed to class rights.").
29. Croson, 488 U.S. at 488; accord Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 500 (1979)
(Powell, J., concurring). What did Justice Powell mean by the term "unique" in his Fullilove
concurrence? A lower court argued the word "unique" was somewhat ambiguous and was
not intended to foreclose the powers possessed by other competent governmental bodies. See
Keip, 713 F.2d at 172 ("Though Justice Powell in Fullilove referred to the power of Congress
as 'unique' we believe he meant the power was 'notable' or 'unequalled,' not 'sole' or
'exclusive[.]').
30. Croson, 488 U.S. at 485. Justice O'Connor also reasoned that since African-Americans
held "[flive of the nine seats on the [Richmond] city council" and since the set-aside favored
African-Americans who "comprise[d] approximately 50% of the ... city of Richmond" the
Croson scenario was similar to situations where a white majority enacts a plan that discriminates
against African-Americans. Id. at 495. Justice O'Connor failed to note that
although there may be a majority of [African-Americans] on the City Council,
the fact that there is no [African-American] majority in Richmond should serve
as a powerful incentive for [African-American] Council members not to act with
disregard for the interests of one half of their constituents. In any event, the
... decision to adopt the [set-aside] was not made strictly along racial lines.
One white council member voted with the majority and another abstained.
Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 1774 (footnote omitted).
31. Croson, 488 U.S. at 497.
32. Id. at 497, 504.
33. Id. at 492.
34. Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment states: "No state shall ... deny . .. any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, §
1. This section prohibits purposeful discrimination by the state and also prohibits state action
which may perpetuate the effects of past discrimination.
[Vol. 67:169
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unlike Congress, need no enforcement provision to apply the fourteenth
amendment within their jurisdictions."
Second, since states have police powers which enable them to "protect
the health, safety and morals in the community, ' 3 6 Virginia might have
constitutionally created a state race-specific set-aside program. Because the
Supreme Court has held in the past that state legislation prohibiting race
discrimination is within the police power of the state, 37 it would logically
follow for the Court to rely on the police power as authority for states to
remedy the present effects of past discrimination. 3 In Croson, Justice
Marshall argued in dissent that states could enact set-aside programs under
the authority of their police powers: "[N]othing in the [three reconstruction]
Amendments themselves, or in our long history of interpreting or applying
those momentous charters, suggests that States, exercising their police power,
are in any way constitutionally inhibited from working alongside the Federal
Government in the fight against discrimination and its effects." 39 Therefore,
state police power could be a source of authority independent of the
fourteenth amendment to alleviate racial imbalances caused by past and
present discriminatory practices.
The Croson Court believed that strict scrutiny would advance individual
rights by "ensuring that courts [would] not allow intrusion upon the equal
protection rights of any individuals, including nonminorities, and by re-
stricting to exceptionally meritorious remedial situations the disparate treat-
ment of nonminority individuals under affirmative action programs." 4
Additionally, the Croson Court perceived state and local set-asides as
running counter to the fourteenth amendment's mandate of a race-neutral
35. See, e.g., Kelp, 713 F.2d at 172, in which the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals said:
Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment speaks directly to the states: "nor [shall
any state] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." No enabling provision is required to authorize a state government to enact
legislation to prevent the denial of equal protection to persons within its juris-
diction. The prohibition against denial of equal protection carries with it the
power to prevent such denial and to remedy past violations. When a state
legislature takes steps in compliance with the equal protection clause it is acting
in the same capacity as that of Congress in adopting legislation to implement
the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause.
36. Kende, supra note 26, at 613 (quoting Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE
L.J. 36, 36 n.6 (1964)).
37. District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100, 109 (1953) ("There
is no doubt that legislation which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race ... is within
the police power of the states.").
38. Cf. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504 (implying that the states might constitutionally use race-
conscious relief to compensate for past discrimination if they identify that pattern of discrim-
ination with specificity).
39. Id. at 560-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
40. Taylor, supra note 12, at 54 (footnote omitted).
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society.4' A "color-blind" society42 requires the equal treatment of indivi-
duals within all classes.43 The philosophy of "rac[ial] neutrality" bolsters
the reverse discrimination claims of MBE opponents and supports Justice
Scalia's contention that "[tihe relevant proposition is not that it was
[African-Americans] who were discriminated against, but that it was indi-
vidual men and women, 'created equal,' who were discriminated against. '45
Croson's rhetoric of racial neutrality is flawed for two elementary reasons.
First, it fails to reflect the framers' intent in enacting the fourteenth
amendment. The fourteenth amendment was intended to prevent the
41. Id. at 493. Alexander Bickel advocated this race-neutral view of the fourteenth amend-
ment:
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and the lesson of
contemporary history have been the same for at least a generation: discrimination
on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and
destructive of democratic society. Now this is to be unlearned and we are told
that this is not a matter of fundamental principle but only a matter of whose
ox is gored.
A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975).
42. In Croson, this concept was adopted by Justice Scalia in his concurrence. 488 U.S. at
522 (Scalia, J., concurring).
As Randall Kennedy noted, "the color-blind theory of the Constitution is precisely that-a
'theory,' one of any number of competing theories that seek to interpret the fourteenth
amendment's delphic proscription of state action that denies any person 'the equal protection
of the laws."' Kennedy, supra note 17, at 1335. See also Williams, The Obliging Shell: An
Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2128, 2142 (1989) ("So-
called formal equal opportunity has done a lot but misses the heart of the problem. It put
the vampire back in its coffin, but it was no silver stake. The rules may be color-blind but
people are not."). But see Rosenfeld's contention that the color-blind doctrine has three
virtues:
First, it is very easy to implement and does not require the elaboration of any
complicated theoretical apparatus to determine the nature and scope of its proper
application. Second, justification of the color-blind principle could rest entirely
on the moral axiom that it is wrong for public authorities to draw any distinctions
on the basis of race. This would obviate the need to delve at any depth into the
divisive realm of substantive equality. Third, it provides an effective means of
assuring the prohibition of racial classifications that inure to the disadvantage of
oppressed racial minorities.
For all its virtues, however, the color-blind principle is too blunt . . . and is
incompatible with the Supreme Court's endorsement of color-conscious remedies
in a long line of school desegregation cases.
Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 1755-56 (footnote omitted).
43. Kennedy, supra note 17, at 1327 ("Opponents of affirmative action maintain that
commitment to a nonracist social environment requires strict color-blindness in decisionmaking
as both a strategy and a goal."); see also Thomas, Affirmative Action Goals and Timetables:
Too Tough? Not Tough Enough!, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 402, 410-11 (1987) ("[T]o whatever
extent we do want to give preferences to compensate those who have been unfairly deprived
.... [they] should be directly related to the obstacles that have been unfairly placed in those
individuals' paths, rather than on the basis of race .... ") (footnote omitted) (emphasis
added); Belton, supra note 17, at 540 ("[T]he notion of color-blindness .... is often analogized
to positions in a foot race: if race is eliminated as a factor in the employment decision,
[African-Americans] will be on an equal footing with whites.") (footnote omitted).
44. E.g., Williams, supra note 42, at 2137-43.
45. Croson, 488 U.S. at 529 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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majority class of white Americans from discriminating against African-
Americans and to protect African-Americans against the horrors of Recon-
struction statutes. 46 In his dissent in Croson, Justice Marshall asserted
that Congress' concern in passing the Reconstruction Amendments, and
particularly their congressional authorization provisions, was that States
would not adequately respond to racial... discrimination against newly
freed slaves. To interpret any aspect of these Amendments as proscribing
state remedial responses to these very problems turns the Amendments
on their heads. 47
The Court's color-blind interpretation is thus bankrupt historically.
Second, Justice O'Connor's rhetoric of racial neutrality fails to account
for the repressive treatment endured historically by racial minorities not
because they are individuals but because they are racially identifiable as a
group.4 According to one commentator, such beliefs of "color-blindness
46. See Weeden, The Status of Affirmative Action in 1986 and Beyond, 31 How. L.J. 33,
34-35 (1988) ("The fourteenth amendment was one of those Civil War Amendments [amend-
ments XIII, XIV, and XV] designed to provide [African-Americans] with freedom from slavery,
citizenship privileges, due process and equal protection rights, and the right to vote.") (footnote
omitted); Kennedy, supra note 17, at 1335 ("The opponents of affirmative action have stripped
the historical context from the demand for race-blind law.").
African-Americans are not the only minorities that should benefit from the fourteenth
amendment. Historically, other minorities, such as Spanish-speaking persons, Asian-Americans,
Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts, those cited in Croson, 488 U.S. at 506, have experienced similar
discriminatory treatment. Therefore, "[r]esponsible inquiry must seek to determine the reasons
why courts give unusually demanding scrutiny to classifications by which the dominant White
majority has advantaged itself at the expense of [African-Americans], and to what extent those
reasons apply where that majority chooses to disadvantage itself in favor of [African-
Americans]." Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cm. L. REv.
723, 728 (1974). See generally Kennedy, supra note 17, at 1345 ("Proponents of affirmative
action view their opponents with suspicion for good reason. They know that not all of their
opponents are racist; they also know that many of them are.").
47. Croson, 488 U.S. at 559 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
48. Affirmative action cannot be isolated from the historical treatment of African-Americans
as a group:
The affirmative action concept embodies a policy decision that some forms of
race-conscious remedies are necessary to improve the social and economic status
of [African-Americans] in our society. That policy decision, however, cannot be
isolated from the history that gave rise to the affirmative action concept. When
viewed in the light of that history-decades of blatant public and private dis-
crimination against [African-Americans] as a group-the underlying premise of
affirmative action is manifest: If the chasm between "equality" as an abstract
proposition and "equality" as a reality is to be bridged, something more is
needed than mere prohibitions of positive acts of discrimination and the substi-
tution of passive neutrality. That something more, the affirmative action concept
dictates, must include race-conscious remedies.
Belton, supra note 17, at 534 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
The Supreme Court has also noted:
From the inception of our national life, [African-Americans] have been subjected
to unique legal disabilities impairing access to equal ... opportunity. Under
slavery, penal sanctions were imposed upon anyone attempting to educate [Af-
rican-Americans]. After the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment the States
1991]
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and equal process ... would make no sense at all in a society in which
identifiable groups had actually been treated differently historically and in
which the effects of this difference in treatment continued into the pres-
ent." ' 49 Her analysis was also fallacious historically when she professed that
"Sec[tion] 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment stemmed from a distrust of
state legislative enactments based on race." 50 In fact, the fourteenth amend-
ment was a result of distrust by Congress of state legislation that discrim-
inated against African-Americans based on race.
The color-blind interpretation of the fourteenth amendment that Croson
espoused5' perpetuates perceptions of an ideal American society that should
exist but that in reality does not. Fatalistic prejudicial beliefs and racial
intolerance of minorities are not phenomena of the past.52
Racism is far from dead in the United States. Despite undeniable progress
for many, no American of African descent, regardless of status or
success, is safe from racial aggression ranging from an unthinking insult
to a life-threatening attack. Even the most successful [African-Americans]
are haunted by the plight of their less fortunate brethren who struggle
to survive in what social scientists call "the underclass." Burdened with
life-long poverty and soul-devastating despair, they live their lives beyond
the pale of the American dream53
A recent study revealed that a majority of Americans believe African-
Americans as a group are more lazy, less intelligent, and less patriotic than
continued to deny [African-Americans] equal ... opportunity, enforcing a strict
policy of segregation that itself stamped [African-Americans] as inferior.
Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 371 (1978) (citations omitted) (footnote
omitted).
The Fourteenth Amendment, the embodiment in the Constitution of our abiding
belief in human equality, has been the -law of the land for only slightly more
than half [of] its [two hundred] years. And for [one hundred years] the Equal
Protection Clause was ... moribund .... [T]he clause was early turned against
those whom it was intended to set free, condemning them to a "separate but
equal" status before the law, a status always separate but seldom equal.
Id. at 326-27 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
49. See Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1345 (1988) (emphasis added).
50. Croson, 488 U.S. at 491.
51. See id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring).
52. See, e.g., id. at 529 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Precursory results of a continuing survey
of white Americans conducted by the University of California at Berkeley's Survey Research
Center found that nine percent of the white American respondents "expressed antagonism to
[African-Americans] when asked questions about integration." Winkler, While Concern Over
Race Relations Has Lessened Among Whites, Sociologists Say Racism is Taking New Forms,
Not Disappearing, Chron. of Higher Educ., Sept. 11, 1991, at A8. col. 2, All, col. 1. Fifty-
one percent of the respondents expressed hostility toward African-Americans when asked about
antidiscrimination measures such as affirmative action programs. Id. Paul Sniderman, professor
of political science at Stanford University, commented that the results "mean[] the odds of
an] [African-American] facing discrimination are high .... If [the] results are correct, then
racism remains." Id.
53. Bell, Racism: A Prophecy for the Year 2000, 42 RUTGERs L. REV. 93, 96 (1989).
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white Americans. 54 Economic opportunities are not equitably distributed to
all members of our society.5 5 Discrimination aimed at minorities in the
workplace is still prevalent.5 6 Residential segregation based on race, subtle
and apparent, is as alive and well today as it was thirty years ago.17 In
short, the health and welfare of this country's African-American population
is alarmingly lower than white Americans in every conceivable area.5 8
54. A nationwide survey conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the
University of Chicago revealed these responses from non-African American respondents:
* 78% said African-Americans as a group are more likely than whites "to prefer to live off
welfare" and are less likely "to be self-supporting."
* 62% said African-Americans "are more likely to be lazy."
* 56% said African-Americans are "less intelligent."
* 51% said "they think [African-Americans] are less patriotic."
Whites' Racial Stereotypes Persist, supra note 21, at A4, col. 4. Tom W. Smith of the research
center said that the responses explain that "in part the reason why people are against affirmative
action or quotas is that they have images of minorities that brand minorities as undeserving
of help." Id. at Al, col. 1.
55. The following are stark statistics provided by a 1987 study done by Alan Hutchinson:
* 32.4% of African-American families were below the poverty line.
* 47.3% of African-American children were below the poverty line.
* 17.2% of African-Americans were unemployed in 1984, when only 7.2% of whites were
unemployed.
* The median income for all African-American families in 1983 was $14,506, while the median
income for all white families was $25,757.
Hutchinson, Indiana Dworkin and Law's Empire, 96 YALE L.J. 637, 662-64 (1987) (citations
omitted).
The United States Census Bureau reported that white United States households have 10
times the median wealth of African-American households. The survey, conducted in 1988,
found that the median white household had net assets of $43,280 and the median African-
American household had net assets that totaled only $4170. In addition, the census report
found that the median white household had a monthly income of $2064 and the median
African-American household had a monthly income of $1305. Huge Disparity in Wealth Found
Among Races, Wash. Post, Jan. 11, 1991, at A3, col. 1.
John Jacob, president of the National Urban League, said: "It really means the poverty we
see demonstrated in the [African-American] community is likely to continue for some time
.... We're [African-Americans] not going to move toward a position of parity without
increasing the wealth of [African-American] communiti[es] and we can't do that without doing
something about ... business ownership .... Id. at A3, col. 3.
56. In a study conducted in the summer of 1990, two-person teams, consisting of one
African-American and one white job applicant, applied for identical entry-level jobs. Whites
faced discrimination 7% of the time while African-Americans were discriminated against 20%
of the time. "From the employer's perspective, these were two [applicants] making an equal
effort, who were equally attractive as job candidates. We're confident the only difference was
their race." Job Hunt: Blacks Face More Bias, USA Today, May 15, 1991, at Al, col. 5.
57. See R. FARLEY & W. ALLEN, TnE COLOR LINE AND THE QuAITY OF LIFE IN AMERICA
140-41 (1987) (On a 100-point scale where a score of 100 represents an apartheid society in
which all whites and all African-Americans live in racially homogeneous areas, residential
segregation in the twenty-five United States cities with the largest African-American populations
averaged 88 in 1960 and 81 in 1980.); see also Denton & Massey, Residential Segregation of
Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians by Socioeconomic Status and Generation, 69 Soc. Sci. Q. 797,
813-14 (1988) (In the 1980s, African-Americans of all socioeconomic levels continue to be
racially segregated in spite of their desires for integration.).
58. See Hutchinson, supra note 55, at 662-64.
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Justice O'Connor admitted that "the sorry history of both private and
public discrimination in this country has contributed to a lack of opportu-
nities for [African-American] entrepreneurs." 5 9 Nonetheless, she added that
"it is sheer speculation how many minority firms there would be in Rich-
mond absent past societal discrimination. '"60 Although it would be difficult
to predict accurately the number of minority firms in Richmond that would
have existed had racial discrimination in the Deep South never existed, the
number would doubtless have been higher.
In suggesting an explanation for the underrepresentation of African-
Americans in the Richmond construction industry, Justice O'Connor said
that they may have been "disproportionately attracted to industries other
than construction. ' 6' Nonetheless, she failed to account for the historical
fact that prior to the reconstruction of the South after the Civil War, the
construction industry in the South was dominated by skilled African-
American slaves. 62 The post-Civil War era brought on purposeful acts of
discrimination against African-American workers. For example, construction
craft unions intentionally barred African-Americans from applying for mem-
bership. As a result, these unions became exclusively white.6 In an opinion
preceding Croson, the Supreme Court, fully aware of the prevalence of
discrimination in the construction industry, stated: "Judicial findings of
[African-Americans'] exclusion from [construction] crafts on racial grounds
are so numerous as to make such exclusion a proper subject for judicial
notice.'' 64 Justice O'Connor should not dismiss lightly the magnitude of
racial discrimination endured by African-Americans as mere speculation or
vestiges of the past. 65
The focus of the debate should not be whether "a disappointed white
contractor had a constitutional right to a government contract ... [but]
whether he had a mere expectation that the system would continue as it
had in the past."' 66 In an American society where racism is prevalent, race-
59. Croson, 488 U.S. at 499. Perhaps Justice O'Connor was noting Richmond's reputation
as being the "cradle of the Old Confederacy" due to its sorrowful history of slavery,
segregation, and racial discrimination. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 1746 ("Through
the official acts of its governing officials, Richmond, among other things, deliberately diluted
the voting rights of its [African-American] residents, mounted stiff hurdles against school
desegregation, and sanctioned pervasive housing discrimination.").
60. Croson, 488 U.S. at 499.
61. Id. at 503. Rosenfeld counters this argument by contending that "it was mere speculation
for Justice O'Connor to assert that the virtual exclusion of [African-Americans] from the
construction industry might have been the result of free career choices rather than the
consequences of fierce, direct racial discrimination." Rosenfeld, supra note 7, at 1792.
62. 1 H. HiLL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM II (BNA 1977).
63. Thomas, supra note 19, at 16.
64. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198 n.1 (1979).
65. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 17, at 1331.
66. Thomas, supra note 19, at 17.
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conscious set-aside programs are a necessity. 67 Unfortunately, state and local
MBE's are imperiled by Croson's mandate of strict scrutiny.
II. THE FACTUAL PREDICATE DILEMMA
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. 68 marked the first time the Supreme
Court dealt with the constitutionality of a municipal race-conscious set-
aside. The Croson MBE was modeled after the federal MBE upheld in
Fullilove v. Klutznik.69 In Fullilove, only Chief Justice Burger implied that
Congress was singularly the germane body to mandate legislation based on
racial criteria.70 None of the Justices in the dissent, Justices Stewart,
Rehnquist, and Stevens, held "states to higher standards than those appli-
cable to Congress." ' 7' State and local governments perceived the Court's
silence as a judicial green light to establish set-aside programs fashioned
after the set-aside in Fullilove.
In Fullilove, the majority upheld a congressionally sponsored set-aside
even though the MBE lacked "any contemporaneous legislative hearings or
committee reports of debate justifying its action. ' 72 State and local govern-
ments took this to mean that they could do the same.73 Subsequently, state
and local governments nationwide enacted set-aside programs based on
"generalized evidence in support of the existence of discrimination. ' 74
Reviewing courts upheld these set-asides without requiring a precise factual
predicate, 75 and for a period of nine years such programs multiplied.
Croson radically altered the Fullilove foundation by requiring state and
local governments to establish a "prima facie case of a constitutional or
statutory violation" in order to justify race-conscious set-aside programs. 76
Croson requires that state and local governments establish more than
generalized evidence of minority underrepresentation due to historical or
present discriminatory practices. 77 Additionally, under Croson it is insuffi-
cient for lawmakers to merely label state and local set-asides as "remedial"
measures because "[riacial classifications are suspect, and that means that
simple legislative assurances of good intention cannot suffice." '78
67. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
68. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
69. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
70. Id. at 473; see also Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L.J. 453, 474 & n.100 (1987) (In Fullilove,
Chief Justice Burger "thought it dispositive that the set-aside emanated from Congress.").
71. Days, supra note 70, at 474.
72. Id. at 476.
73. Id. at 475-76 & n.107.
74. Id. at 477.
75. Id. at 476, 477.
76. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500. For a further discussion of the factual predicate mandated
by Croson, see Taylor, supra note 12, at 58-62.
77. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-501.
78. Id. at 500.
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Other generalized evidence found by the Court to be inept and of little
probative value were allegations of racial discrimination in a relevant in-
dustry, 79 findings of racial discrimination nationwide and in other cities and
states,80 and evidence of previous discrimination in the relevant industry. 81
Under the analysis of Croson, evidence of these types failed to "adequately
identify actionable discrimination nor do they permit tailoring of an appro-
priately narrow remedy." 82
Croson dictates that state and local governments identify the specific
discrimination the set-aside is to remedy.83 For example, evidence that a
state or municipality engaged in specific discriminatory practices would be
specific direct evidence of a constitutional or statutory violation.
In addition, gross disparities "between the number of MBE members in
local trade associations and the number of MBEs eligible for membership
in such associations ' 8 4 would be enough to support the creation of a race-
conscious set-aside program. Statistics that show distinct differences between
"the percentage of the relevant governmental contracts awarded to MBEs
and the percentage of MBEs that the government deems qualified to perform
such contracts" would also be sufficient under Croson.s
The percentage of contracts awarded to MBEs must take into consid-
eration both the relevant prime contracts the government awards directly
to MBEs and the relevant prime contracts that nonminority prime
contractors subcontract to MBEs. Croson . . . also indicate[s] that the
number of MBEs included in this statistical comparison should only
encompass qualified MBEs that engage in the particular industry subject
to the set-aside program in question."6
State and local governments are not equipped to compile the technical
statistics necessary to fulfill the required factual predicate. Many states keep
few or no written records of their proceedings. 7 Local governmental bodies,
such as city councils and county legislatures, fall far behind even the states
in their ability to compile the necessary records. In sum, the majority of
79. Id. at 498.
80. Id. at 500.
81. Id. at 504.
82. Taylor, supra note 12, at 61 (discussing the Court's holding in Croson); see also
Croson, 488 U.S. at 505 (The evidence of the school desegregation experience in Richmond
and congressional reports provides insufficient data "to define the scope of any injury to
minority contractors in Richmond or the necessary remedy.").
83. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505.
84. Taylor, supra note 12, at 61.
85. Id. at 61-62. But see Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors v. Cuomo, 743 F.
Supp. 977, 998, 999, 1001 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (refusing to uphold an MBE set-aside despite
statistical evidence of discrimination because it was "too generalized and conclusory to meet
the stringent requirements of Croson"; "identified instances of racial discrimination" are
required instead).
86. Taylor, supra note 12 at 61-62.
87. Kende, supra note 26, at 614 n.144.
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states and virtually all local governmental bodies are not capable of fulfilling
Croson's factual predicate.
Croson's impact was immediate. Lower courts, frequently citing Croson
as precedent, have invalidated several state and local set-asides.88 Croson
threatens to erode affirmative action strides of the past two decades. How
can the federal government, vested with the power of the fourteenth
amendment's enforcement clause, aid in protecting and encouraging the
growth of state and local set-asides?
III. PROPOSED GuIDELwN s FOR THE USE OF FEDERAL FwDINGs OF
PAST DISCRIMINATION By STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
State and local governments desiring to encourage and support the creation
and continued existence of minority-owned businesses within their jurisdic-
tions are now faced with two stark realities. First, City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.'s19 factual predicate requires them to compile extensive
and complex technical data to establish evidence of specific racial discrim-
ination within their jurisdictions. Second, they are faced with growing fiscal
demands and ever-shrinking budgets, making it more difficult to compile
the evidence required. Thus, the desperate need to alleviate racial discrim-
ination within the economic sector may be stifled by Croson's requirement
of a rigid factual predicate. These concerns would be alleviated best through
enactment by Congress of legislation enabling states and localities to utilize
specific evidence of discrimination contained in congressional studies and
findings.
This legislation should be passed for three reasons. First, it would permit
states and localities to rely on federal findings, thereby making it easier for
them to enact MBE programs which would meet the factual predicate
requirement of Croson. This reliance would reduce the implementation costs
associated with state and local MBE programs. Second, this legislation
would encourage Congress to produce region-specific findings. Third, the
legislation would address Justice O'Connor's concern that state and local
legislators might aid their own racial groups. 90
Croson refused to allow Richmond to rely on congressional findings of
"nationwide discrimination in the construction industry" because "Congress
explicitly recognized that the scope of the problem would vary" 91 from state
88. See, e.g., Miami Tele-Communications v. City of Miami, 743 F. Supp. 1573 (S.D. Fla.
1990); Tafoya v. City of Albuquerque, 751 F. Supp. 1527 (D.N.M. 1990); Harrison, 743 F.
Supp. 977.
89. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
90. See id. at 506, 510.
91. Id. at 504 (emphasis added).
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to state. 92 However, the Court noted that "[s]tates and their subdivisions
may take remedial action when they possess evidence that their own spending
practices are exacerbating a pattern of prior discrimination. " 93 Therefore,
Croson would permit state and local legislators to rely on federal findings
so long as such findings were region-specific.
Congress's "unique powers" to enforce the fourteenth amendment de-
mand that it disseminate information to aid state and local governments in
implementing MBE programs. The proposed legislation would fulfill Con-
gress's responsibility under the fourteenth amendment. Although Congress
is not required to make specific findings of discrimination to enact federal
set-asides, Congress does frequently produce such evidence. Extensive tes-
timony regarding discriminatory practices observed within the fifty states is
often presented by expert witnesses at legislative hearings. The proposed
legislation would make Congress cognizant of its responsibility to produce
region-specific evidence during such hearings and would thereby increase
the availability of this information.
92. See id. The Court said:
While the States and their subdivisions may take remedial action when they
possess evidence that their own spending practices are exacerbating a pattern of
prior discrimination, they must identify that discrimination ... with some spec-
ificity before they may use race-conscious relief .... If all a state or local
government need do is find a congressional report on the subject to enact a set-
aside program, the constraints of the Equal Protection Clause will, in effect,
have been rendered a nullity.
Id. (citation omitted). See also Days, supra note 70, at 480:
State and local agencies creating set-asides should, for example, be able to rely
in part upon federal legislative or agency findings and judicial determinations
regarding nationwide discrimination against minority business enterprises as pred-
icates for considering the propriety of set-asides in their respective jurisdictions.
But it is essential that state and local agencies also establish the presence of
discrimination in their own bailiwicks, based either upon their own fact-finding
processes or upon determinations made by other competent institutions, such as
courts and administrative agencies.
93. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504. States can presently utilize federal nationwide findings to
establish state set-aside programs if the programs are adopted to satisfy governmental conditions
for the receipt of federal funding. See, e.g., Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 710
F. Supp. 1532 (W.D. Wis. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2261 (1991). Congress enacted
legislation which "establish[ed] a 10% goal for expenditures with disadvantaged businesses"
in the construction of highways. Id. at 1535. In implementing this legislation, the State of
Wisconsin used congressional findings of generalized evidence of discrimination to create a
state set-aside program. The district court upheld the Wisconsin set-aside because the program
was found to be a subsidiary of a federal program. Id. at 1545. The Fiedler court applied the
equal protection analysis of Fullilove. The court also noted that Wisconsin could not have
otherwise established the set-aside based solely on congressional findings of nationwide dis-
crimination. Id. at 1546.
In contrast, in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 110 S. Ct.
2997 (1990), the Supreme Court applied an intermediate level of scrutiny to uphold the FCC's
program awarding enhancements for minority ownership in proceedings for FCC licenses and
its "distress sale" program, which permits certain existing radio and television stations to be
transferred only to minority-controlled firms. Id. at 3002.
[Vol. 67:169
SET-ASIDE PROGRAMS
Reliance on particularized congressional committee findings would aid
states in amassing the direct evidence needed to establish proof of discrim-
ination sufficient to satisfy the factual predicate required by Croson. Con-
gress has financial resources, manpower, and expertise that states lack for
gathering the necessary data. 94 Additionally, the use of congressional chron-
icles would alleviate the record-keeping dilemma encountered by states and
localities which do not keep transcripts of their investigatory proceedings.
In addition to citing federal findings, a state or locality would still be
responsible for providing adequate showings that "the discriminatory prac-
tice has been defined adequately; [that] alternatives short of explicit reliance
upon race have been canvassed and found wanting; and [that] any race-
conscious remedy has been sufficiently limited in scope." 95 The fulfillment
of these factors would enable states and localities to fashion affirmative
action programs that identify specific discriminatory practices and establish
a factual predicate strong enough to show a "prima facie case of a
constitutional or statutory violation." 96
Finally, use of congressional records would address Justice O'Connor's
concern that state and local legislators might enact legislation furthering
their own racial group. Findings from various federal sources would not be
derived from state and local legislators or interest groups. Such evidence of
discriminatory practices would be devoid of possible deviant localized mo-
tives.97
CONCLUSION
The United States Congress should enact legislation to aid states and
localities in establishing race-conscious set-aside programs. This legislation
would enable state and local governments to utilize specific evidence of
discrimination contained in congressional findings so that states may more
easily satisfy the factual predicate mandated by Croson. This legislation
would help states and localities in eradicating the effects of past racial
discrimination and in furthering economic stability and growth. The resulting
legislation should be narrowly tailored to address specifically-identified
94. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 503 (1980) (Congress has "information and
expertise that [it] acquires in the consideration and enactment of earlier legislation."); Kende,
supra note 26, at 605 ("Congress may also have intimate knowledge of state activities that
perpetuate discrimination, given the information it derives from overseeing federal revenue-
sharing programs and commerce regulation." (emphasis in original)).
95. Days, supra note 70, at 457.
96. Croson, 488 U.S. at 500 (citations omitted).
97. Justice Scalia explained in Croson, 488 U.S. at 522-23, that because the country is
divided into factions, namely the states, Congress could not be used as a vehicle for the
furtherance of discrimination by a minority group.
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discriminatory practices in order to establish a prima facie case of an equal
protection violation.
MBEs can effectively aid in eliminating America's tradition of discrimi-
nation against people of color. Croson should not be allowed to end the
past era of growth in affirmative action programs. The rapid demise of
state and local set-asides has already closed the doors of opportunity to a
sizable number of minorities attempting to share in this country's economic
wealth. Regardless of the persistent efforts of individual minorities and
nonminorities, the color of one's skin still denies equal opportunities to a
large segment of this nation's minority populace. Racial discrimination must
be eradicated from our society by eliminating prevalent racial barriers.
Minorities must be incorporated into the mainstream of American business.
Resurrecting state and local set-asides is vital to transforming dreams of
economic equality for minorities into reality.
